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Can the Euro Be Saved? An Analysis
of the Future of the Currency Union◊
Joseph E. Stiglitz*
Columbia University, New York
Following the Great Recession, eurozone countries have per-
formed worse than even the currency union’s most pessimistic
critics had predicted. The paper identifies the strong funda-
mental flaws in the design of the eurozone and proposes a set
of reforms, both in the structure of the eurozone and current
policies, which might enable the euro to work. It traces the
flaws to economic misconceptions prevalent at the time the
euro was designed, some of which continue to predominate.
Reform is likely less costly than allowing the euro to break up.
The required political will, however, is not in evidence.
[JEL Classification: E320; E520; E580; E610;  E630;
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1. - Introduction
Critics of the euro always said that the test would be an asymmetric shock that
hit some countries in the euro zone differently from others. Because the euro was
not an optimal currency area, the suggestion was that the adjustment to the shock
would be painful. If the European Central Bank (ECB) focused its policy on the
countries with a strong economy, those with a weak one would go into a recession;
if it focused on those with a weak economy, those with a strong economy would
face inflation. In fact, the euro countries have performed far more poorly than
even these critics suspected. The downturns facing many of the countries are worse
than in the Great Depression, and there is no end in sight: even optimists believe
it will be years before the countries in depression return to full employment. But
the damage done in the meantime will be long-lived: in some of the countries, the
most talented young people will have emigrated. Families will be torn apart. Lives
will be ruined. The productive potential of millions of young people will be un-
dermined; their life time incomes reduced enormously. So too will the potential
growth of the country. Such suffering, all in the name of creating a more prosper-
ous Europe! All in the name of a man-made artifice, of a monetary system. And
all of this was unnecessary. Europe was not hit by an earthquake, a natural disaster.
This is a man-made calamity that could easily have been avoided. 
There is a sigh of relief that the eurozone has not fallen apart, and that at last the
decline seems to have come to an end. But the return to growth is a far cry from a
return to prosperity. Today, many of the countries of Europe have an output per
capita (adjusted for inflation) that is well below that before the crisis. (See Table 1).
Even Germany, often touted as the most successful country, has grown at a
miserly average annual rate of 0.72 percent from 2009-20131, a rate that in other
circumstances would be called an utter failure; adjusted for inflation, a rate that
is below that of Japan during the last decade of its twenty-year malaise (0.80 per-
cent for 2001-20102), especially once account is taken of the rate of growth of its
work force. Japan’s working age population (ages 15 to 64) shrank 5.5 percent
from 2001 to 2010, while the German working age population shrank 3.6 per-
cent, and the number of Americans of that age increased by 9.2 percent. Thus,
the GDP per working age population growth in these countries looks quite dif-
ferent from the growth figures more generally: between 2001 and 2010, Japan’s
1 Data from the IMF World Economic Outlook database of April 2014.
2 Data from the IMF World Economic Outlook database of April 2014. 
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GDP per working age population grew 14.2 percent, Germany’s grew 12.6 per-
cent, and America’s grew just 6.4 percent.3
But the failure of the eurozone is deeper than even these numbers would sug-
gest. As the International Commission on the Measurement of Economic Per-
formance and Social Progress has emphasized4, GDP provides a poor measure of
overall economic performance. It does not, for instance, take into account how
the fruits of growth are shared: even in Germany, large fractions of the population
are seeing a decline in their incomes adjusted for inflation; and in most countries,
the standard of living of ordinary workers may be hurt even more than the con-
ventional statistics indicate, as they face more insecurity and cutbacks in public
programs which are essential to their well-being. 
Looking over the short history of the euro, the good years and the bad, the
good countries and the bad, it becomes clear that Europe is far below the trend
that it had followed in the years before the euro. The good years do not even come
close to compensating for the bad years. (See Graph 1). And the gap between
where Europe plausibly might have been, had there been no euro, and where it
will be in the future, is only going to grow – at least unless major reforms are made. 
Germany likes to lecture the other countries, asking them to do what it has
done. But even though its economic model can hardly be called a success, it is
based on a strategy that cannot be universally followed. Its growth is based in
part on its strong trade surpluses. But not all countries can have trade surpluses:
A basic identity has it that the sum of trade deficits must equal trade surpluses.
The failure of the euro is, I believe an almost inevitable result of the structure
of the euro. And the flawed structure of the euro was in turn the almost inevitable
result of its creators embedding into its design – in its “constitution” – fads and
fashions of the time without providing for enough flexibility to respond to chang-
ing circumstances and understandings. Many of its features reflected the neo-
classical model, with the associated neoliberal policy prescriptions fashionable (in
some circles) at the time of the creation of the euro. Even then, the limitations
of the neo-classical model had been widely exposed – the problems posed, for in-
stance, by imperfect competition, information, and markets. Likewise, the neo-
classical model failed to recognize the many market failures that require
government intervention, or in which government intervention would improve
the performance of the overall economy. 
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3 Based on comparison of data from the World Bank World Development Indicators.
4 STIGLITZ J.E., FITOUSSI J.P.  and SEN A. (2010). 
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Even with this flawed set of ideas, the euro might have worked, had they got-
ten certain details right. Details matter. 
Based on an analysis of the flaws, I will try to explain why reforms in the struc-
ture of the euro are a matter of urgency. It is the structure of the euro that needs
to be reformed more than the structure of individual countries. Without these
structural reforms, the poor performance of the eurozone is likely to continue,
with consequences for years to come. 
The structural problems of the euro have, however, been compounded by a
critical policy mistake – that of extreme austerity. But for any country to simply
abandon fiscal constraints is not the solution. The euro is a Europe-wide project.
The problems were collectively created. The only solution is a collective solution. 
Let me make clear at the onset, that I believe strongly in the Europe project, not
only the political project of ensuring peace in a part of the world that had been
plagued by two world wars in the last century, but also in the economic project,
where one could take advantage of economies of scale, the principles of comparative
advantage, and the potential for greater stability to enhance the living standards of
all. But good intentions are not enough. As designed, the euro project has not only
led to worse overall economic performance, but has also provided a framework in
which inequality is likely to grow, with the fruits of whatever limited growth that
does occur going to the those at the top. An economic system in which most citizens
do not fully share in the fruits of the growth is one that I judge to be a failure. 
Let me foreshadow my conclusions: Europe faces a choice. It could make the
reforms suggested below, which could help restore shared prosperity and allow
Europe and Europeans to live up to their potential. It could carry on as it has
been, muddling through, doing the minimum set of reforms that prevent the col-
lapse of the euro, but do not allow for a true recovery, at least not any time soon.
One might call this course the course of brinkmanship, giving the countries just
enough assistance to maintain their hope, but not enough to support a robust re-
covery. The danger of brinkmanship is that one sometimes goes over the brink.
How that might happen is a subject beyond this brief paper. Nor do I ask, if the
euro were to break up, how should it be done in a way that imposes the least
cost?5 Suffice it to say that the breakup will be costly. But we should be clear: the
second strategy, muddling through, is also enormously costly. Neither is a pleas-
ant alternative. That is why I have focused on the first course: reforming the euro
to make it viable. 
5 The consensus among economists is that Germany should leave the euro, but I do not have
space to explain why that is the case here. 
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But let me reiterate: there is a real urgency to making the reforms. It will not do
to say, yes, we know we need a banking union, but we must construct it carefully,
and that will take years. With this mentality, these will be years during which the
suffering mounts, years during which irreversible damage occurs, years during which
the promises of the European project get dashed. In my mind, the consequences of
such a course are barely distinguishable from those of muddling through, keeping
open the hope of reform in the future to ensure that the euro will not fall apart, but
in ways that inflict unconscionable harm on the citizens in the afflicted countries. 
2. - Key Misconceptions at the Time of the Founding of the Euro
The euro was a political project, conceived to help bring the countries of Eu-
rope together. It was widely recognized at the time that Europe was not an opti-
mal currency area.6 Labor mobility was limited, the countries’ economies were
vulnerable to different kinds of shocks, and there were divergent long-term pro-
ductivity trends. 
While it was a political project, the politics was not strong enough to create
the economic institutions that might have given the euro a fair chance of success.
The hope was that over time, that would happen. But, of course, when national
economies were doing well, few felt the impetus to “complete” the project, and
when a crisis finally occurred (with the global recession that began in the United
States in 2008), it was hard to carefully think through what should be done to
ensure the success of the euro. 
I and others who supported the concept of European integration hoped that
when Greece found itself in crisis, in January 2010, European leaders would dis-
play both an understanding of what needed to be done to ensure the stability of
Greece and the survival of the euro, and enough commitment to European soli-
darity to ensure that the requisite steps were undertaken. That did not happen,
and, swiftly, a project originally designed to bring Europe together became a
source of divisiveness. Germans talked about Europe not being a transfer union
– a euphemistic and seemingly principled way of saying that they were uninter-
ested in helping their partners, as they reminded everyone of how they had paid
so much for the reunification of Germany. Not surprisingly, others talked about
the high price they had paid in World War II, and the enormous German debts
that had been forgiven at the end of the War. Selective memories played out, as
6 See MUNDELL R.A. (1961).
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Germans talked about the dangers of high inflation. But was it inflation or high
unemployment that had brought on the National Socialist government? Is it in-
flation or unemployment that will fuel the political unrest that lies ahead? 
2.1 Convergence Criteria
As I noted, even at its founding, most realized that the eurozone was not an
optimal currency area. The hope was that the countries could “converge”, and
with sufficient convergence, it could become an optimal currency area – or at
least a currency area that would work. If the government kept budgets in line
(kept deficits and debts within the limit set by the Maastricht Treaty), the
member countries’ economies would “converge” so that the single currency
system would work. The founders of the eurozone apparently thought these
budgetary/macro-conditions were enough for the countries to converge, i.e., to
have sufficient “similarity” for a common currency to work. They were wrong.
But in the aftermath of the crisis, Germany and others were slow to admit that
they were wrong: they took the view that it was the failure to adequately enforce
the terms of the Maastricht Treaty that was to blame. This failure to diagnose
the source of the eurozone’s problems was inevitably linked to the failure to take
actions that would address those problems. (To be sure, it may have been a
willful failure: it may not have seemed to be in Germany’s interest to understand
the failures, both those of policy and of the structure of the eurozone, for that
might have called upon it to do more than just lecture its partners).
Greece was castigated for its high debts and deficits; it was natural to blame
the crisis on profligacy, but again there was selective memory: Spain and Ireland
had low debt-to-GDP ratios and a fiscal surplus in the years before the crisis.
Therefore, no one could blame these countries’ predicament on fiscal profligacy.
And no one should hope that insisting on low deficits and debts would prevent
a recurrence of a crisis.
The macro-policies forced on the periphery countries by the troika did not
lead to convergence. The data clearly show they led to divergence. The results
were predictable and predicted. Contractionary fiscal policies had contractionary
effects. The notion that there could be expansionary contractions was a chimera.
While one academic paper7 championed this view, its analysis was quickly shown
to be flawed, both by other academic studies8 and by the IMF.9 The economic
performance of those countries undertaking austerity were repeatedly less than thea
A
7 See for example ALESINA M. and PEROTTI R. (1995) and ALESINA A. and ARDAGNA S. (2010). 
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EU and the ECB anticipated – just as the adverse effects of contractionary policies
in earlier crises had been underestimated. And with disappointing growth, the
improvement in fiscal positions was disappointing too. 
One of the reasons that the models underestimated the magnitude of the con-
traction is that they had not fully internalized what was happening in the financial
sector. This is perhaps not surprising: standard models used by central banks in the
run-up to the 2008 crisis had demonstrated their inadequacies.10 We will turn to an
analysis of the impacts of the eurozone on financial flows in the next section.
2.2 Industrial Policy
While Europe’s leaders were clearly wrong in their beliefs about what might
lead to convergence – necessary for a single currency system – they actually pro-
scribed policies that might have enabled it to function. The market fundamen-
talist neoliberal ideology that was in the air at the time of the founding of the
eurozone seemed to believe that there are natural forces for convergence in pro-
ductivity, without government intervention. But the evidence is to the contrary:
as we look across countries, there has been remarkably little convergence, and in
those countries where there has been convergence (mainly in East Asia), govern-
ments have played a pivotal role, through industrial policies. (Indeed, it has been
well known that there can be increasing returns to scale and scope (reflected in
clustering), the consequence of which is that countries with technological advan-
tages maintain those advantages, unless there are countervailing forces brought
about by government (industrial) policies. But European competition laws pre-
vented, or at least inhibited, such policies.11
8 See for example BAKER D. (2010) and JAYADEV A. and KONCZAL M. (2010) The few countries
that seemed to perform well in spite of austerity were small countries, typically with flexible
exchange rates, with trading partners expanding demand, so that export growth could fill in
the gap caused by the decline in government spending. But after 2008, with most countries
facing a downturn, this was unlikely to happen, especially given the ECB’s monetary policy
(discussed below) leading to a higher exchange rate.
9 See for example INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) (2010). 
10 Subsequently, a large literature has developed explaining why the standard models did so badly.
See, e.g. STIGLITZ J.E. (2011a; 2011b) and BLANCHARD O.J. et AL. (2012). 
11 Even the World Bank has changed its views on industrial policies; yet views about industrial
policies are to a large extent enshrined in the eurozone’s basic economic framework. See LIN
J.Y. (2012); LIN J.Y. and STIGLITZ J.E. (2013) and LIN J.Y., PATEL E. and STIGLITZ J.E. (2013).
For a more general theoretical discussion; see GREENWALD B. and STIGLITZ J.E. (2014).
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2.3 Inflation
There were other deep misconceptions about economic performance that
shaped the rules of the game and the institutions of the eurozone at its founding.
Unfortunately, many of these ideas – fads and fashions – are entrenched in
treaties, making change difficult at best. The “growth and stability pact” (more
aptly called the non-growth and instability pact) restricted fiscal space. A parallel
fallacy constrained monetary policy. There was a belief that for good macroeco-
nomic performance it is necessary, and almost sufficient by itself, to have low and
stable inflation maintained by the monetary authorities. This led to the mandate
of the European Central Bank to focus on inflation, in contrast to that of the
Federal Reserve, whose mandate includes not just inflation, but also growth, em-
ployment, and (now) financial stability. The ECB mandate can lead to a coun-
terproductive response to a crisis, especially one accompanied by cost-push
inflation arising from, say, high energy or food prices. And the policy framework
was particularly poorly suited for a global environment in which other central
banks had more flexible mandates. While the Fed lowered interest rates in re-
sponse to the crisis; the continuing inflationary concerns in Europe meant that
the Fed’s actions were not matched by reductions there. The upshot was an ap-
preciating euro, with downward effects on European output. Had the ECB taken
actions to lower the euro’s exchange value, it would have stimulated the economy,
partially offsetting the effects of austerity. As it was, it allowed the US to engage
in competitive devaluation against it. 
These beliefs also meant that the ECB (and Central Banks within each of the
member countries) studiously avoided doing anything about the real-estate bub-
bles that were mounting in several of them. This was in spite of the fact that the
East Asia crisis had shown that private-sector misconduct – not that of govern-
ment – could bring on an economic crisis. Europe similarly paid no attention to
the run-up in current-account balances in several of the countries, even as the
global discourse talked about the dangers of a disorderly unwinding of global im-
balances. (Attention was centered on China’s surplus and the US deficit, not on
Germany’s surplus and the deficits in Europe’s periphery.)
2.4 Stability of Markets and Stabilizing Markets
Ex post, many policymakers admit that it was a mistake to ignore these cur-
rent-account imbalances or financial market excesses. But the then underlying
ideology provided no framework (it still doesn’t) for identifying good “imbal-
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ances,” when capital is flowing into the country because markets have rationally
identified good investment opportunities, and distinguishing them from bad
ones, i.e., those that are attributable to market excesses. 
The long history of crises in capitalist countries should have warned policy
makers that markets, on their own, are not necessarily efficient or stable. It was
an amazing act of hubris for policy makers in the pre-2008 crisis world to believe
that they had “solved” the problems of economic fluctuations! If only they had
read Kindleberger’s classic study12, they would have realized that the same hubris
had marked policymakers in the run up to earlier crises. The 2008 crisis reminded
us (a) that markets themselves create the major source of economic disturbances,
e.g. credit and asset bubbles; (b) that when there is a disturbance (including those
caused by the market itself) economic forces are not necessarily self-correcting,
at least in a relevant time frame; indeed, they sometimes move the economy fur-
ther away from a full employment equilibrium. It is only through government
policy that these excesses can be controlled – and governments did a good job in
the decades between the Great Depression and the ascent of Reagan-Thatcherism.
Regrettably, some of the market “reforms” in the last few decades increased the
likelihood of an internally generated disturbance, increased countries, exposure
to externally generated perturbations, weakened the “automatic” stabilizers, and
in some cases, replaced them with automatic destabilizers. Because of the ideo-
logical belief that markets were efficient and stable, little attention was paid to
how so-called market reforms were affecting the stability of the economy. 
In this case, flawed models – with inadequate attention to the financial sector
– again contributed to the failure of macroeconomic performance, both in Europe
and America. Based on their models, central bankers and other policymakers be-
lieved that diversification had so spread risk throughout the global economy that
there was nothing to fear, even if the housing bubbles broke. They ignored im-
portant work done before the crisis showing that diversification and the interlink-
ing of financial institutions might actually make matters worse.13 More
remarkable was their own cognitive dissonance: as they talked about contagion
12 KINDLEBERGER C. (1978).
13 See, for example, FREIXAS X. and PARIGI B. (1998); ROCHET J. and TIROLE J. (1996); EISENBERG
L. and NOE T. (2001); LAGUNOFF R. and SCHREFT S. (2001); GALLEGATI M., GREENWALD B.,
RICHIARDI M. and STIGLITZ J.E. (2008); DELLI GATTI D., GALLEGATI M., GREENWALD B.,
RUSSO A. and STIGLITZ J.E. (2006) and BATTISTON S., DELLI GATTI D., GREENWALD B. and
STIGLITZ J.E. (2007). This has been followed by a rash of studies after the crisis, some of which
were based on research done before the crisis. See, e.g. STIGLITZ J.E. (2012a; 2012b); BATTISTON
S., DELLI GATTI D., GALLEGATI M., GREENWALD B. and STIGLITZ J.E. (2012a; 2012b). 
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after a crisis, they grasped that interlinkages could be a problem.14 Yet, before the
crisis, in discussing the design of economic architectures, they studiously ignored
these effects. They should have known the dangers presented by interlinked elec-
tricity networks, and how circuit breakers were installed to ensure stability. But
again, they opposed the use of the equivalent of circuit breakers in financial flows
– capital controls.
Because markets are not self-stabilizing, government has to play a role. The
United States recognized that in the Full Employment Act of 1946, more than
sixty-five years ago. The United States has an economic framework that deals with
most of the problems described earlier: two-thirds of all government expenditures
occur at the national level, and the states are restricted (by their own constitutions)
from incurring debt, other than for capital projects.15 Most banks rely on federal
deposit insurance. States are not restricted from engaging in “industrial policies”,
and poorer states have actively recruited firms to locate in their jurisdictions.16
Europe still does not seem to recognize this. 
2.5 The Feasibility of Internal Devaluation
The most immediate problem facing the eurozone is that the creation of a sin-
gle currency took away two of the critical adjustment mechanisms (interest rates
and exchange rates) and did not put anything in their place. 
Some hoped that internal devaluation would serve as an effective substitute, i.e.,
domestic wages and prices would fall. But there are three fundamental problems
with this solution: (a) it is hard to coordinate such decreases, and in the absence of
such coordination, there can be large and costly changes in relative prices; (b) be-
cause debt is denominated in euros, and thus is not contingent on domestic wages
and prices, debt burdens increase – with adverse consequences seen in bankruptcies
and disruptions of the domestic financial system; there is a common understanding
that one of the problems facing many of the advanced countries in the aftermath
of the crisis is excessive leverage; but deflation, or even disinflation, increases lever-
age; (c) the decrease in collateral values and incomes (especially relative to debts)
would have tightened financial constraints, with first-order adverse effects on the
14 See, e.g. STIGLITZ J.E. (2010a; 2010b).
15 These constitutional requirements have, in recent years, been subverted by the creation of un-
funded pension liabilities, which may create within the States some of the same adverse dy-
namics described below for Europe.
16 However, this has created, to some extent, a race to the bottom, the adverse dynamic that we
describe below as characterizing Europe.
Stiglitz imp:Layout 1  13/10/14  11:29  Pagina 16
J.E. STIGLITZ Can the Euro Be Saved? An Analysis of the Future of the Currency Union
17
economy. Most importantly, if internal devaluation were an effective substitute for
nominal devaluations, then the gold standard would not have been an impediment
to adjusting to the disturbances surrounding the Great Depression17. In the case of
Argentina prior to its 2001 crisis, prices did fall, but not enough –again, an internal
devaluation is not a substitute for exchange-rate adjustment. 
Greece provides a case in point: in spite of (or more accurately because of) se-
vere austerity, its debt-to-GDP ratio is now higher than it was in 2010, in spite
of massive restructurings, in spite of (or more accurately, partly because of) large
declines in wages and prices.
An internal devaluation (accompanied by structural reforms, discussed in the
next section) was supposed to be a substitute for exchange rate flexibility; the
lower real exchange rate was supposed to lead to an increase in exports, providing
an offset to the reduced government spending associated with austerity. Thus,
GDP would be sustained, and at the same time, current account imbalances
would be corrected. Graph 2 shows that in fact exports did not increase in most
of the afflicted countries in the way that was hoped. Graph 3 shows that there
was an improvement in current account balances – mostly the result of the con-
traction of consumption associated with declining incomes. 
2.6 Structural Reform
European leaders have recognized that Europe’s problems will not be solved
without growth. But they have failed to explain how growth can be achieved with
austerity. Instead, they assert that what is needed is a restoration of confidence.
However, austerity will not bring about either growth or confidence. Europe’s
sorry record of ultimately failed policies – repeated attempts to fashion patchwork
solutions for economic problems it was misdiagnosing – undermined confidence.
Because austerity has destroyed growth and lowered standards of living, it also
destroyed confidence, no matter how many speeches are given about the impor-
tance of confidence and growth. (Seemingly miraculously, Mario Draghi’s state-
ment that the ECB would do what it takes has restored confidence in bond
markets, at least temporarily. We discuss below the question of whether it can or
will continue to do so.) 
17 It has been observed that those countries that abandoned the gold standard earlier did better,
but this is partly because of the benefits from competitive devaluation. Of course, countries
that followed a tight monetary policy in order to garner for themselves more gold suffered.
But one could have presumably officially remained on the gold standard, keeping parity with
gold, but not pursued such policies.
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Structural reform is often a euphemism for a particular form of internal de-
valuation: lower the power of workers, so that they take wage costs, lowering the
cost of labor. There is a certain disingenuousness in such proposals. The European
economic project was sold partly on the grounds that it would raise standards of
living. Workers are now being told that to make the euro work (a) they must
take wage cuts; and (b) they must accept cutbacks in the basic provision of public
services. How then is the euro project supposed to increase workers’ incomes –
even if does raise those in the financial sector? Workers are told: be patient. In
the long run, there will be growth, and everyone will benefit – a variant of trickle-
down economics. Anyone in Europe looking across the Atlantic to the American
model should not have much hope: the median income of a full-time male worker
today is lower than it was 40 years ago. And there is no improvement in sight.
And this does not even take into account the increased insecurity that he faces.
As Piketty (2014) reminds us, the period in which the capitalist system delivered
for most citizens has long past; it was but a short interlude between long episodes
in which the capitalist system delivered for the top, and virtually only the top. 
By the same token, while some structural reforms (but not necessarily those
that are being pushed by the troika) will be important for future growth and
higher standards of living over the long term for many of the European countries,
including those currently afflicted with crisis, structural reforms take time. Struc-
tural rigidities did not precipitate the crisis. It was a financial and real estate crisis
that did that.18 Most of the structural reforms are supply side measures, but the
problem today is an inadequacy of demand; worse, many of the structural reforms
will exacerbate that problem, especially those that lead to lower wages and have
adverse distributional effects.
3. - Two Problems That Were Not Fully Grasped
The issues that I described in the previous section were all grasped, at least
partially, both by the critics and the advocates of the euro, though obviously to
different extents. The advocates were optimistic that the problems that had been
pointed out by the critics were less important, or could be fixed. But there were
a few additional problems that were not widely recognized, and have played out
in important ways in the crisis.
18 As is the case in the United States, there may be deeper problems: the structural transformation
that is required by the decline in manufacturing employment and globalization and the grow-
ing inequality which, on its own, lowers aggregate demand. 
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3.1 Borrowing in a Foreign Currency
Since the era of liberalization began, circa 1980, the world has been plagued
by a plethora of financial/debt crises. Many (though not all) take on a familiar
form: the country has borrowed in foreign exchange. Its debts are due. Creditors
won’t roll over their debts. It can’t repay. There is a foreign exchange/debt crisis. 
There are many questions associated with such crises: why did creditors lend
so much? Why did borrowers borrow so much? Why didn’t they foresee the
events ahead? Crises are very costly. Surely there must be a Pareto efficient rene-
gotiation. Yet such renegotiations often do not occur, or do not occur in a manner
that fully forestalls the crisis.
But one thing should be clear: such crises typically do not occur in countries
that have borrowed in their own currency. They can at least fulfill their promises
by printing more of their own money. The money may not be worth as much as
the creditor hoped, but that was a risk that the lender should have understood
before he made the loan. 
The United States will never have a Greek-style crisis, simply because it can
print the money that is owed (a fact that at least one of the rating agencies seems
unaware of). The value of those dollars might diminish were it to resort to such
measures, but (politics aside) there is unlikely to be any event of sufficient mo-
ment to change expectations of inflation so dramatically as to bring on a crisis.
But Greece does not control the printing presses of the currency in which it
has borrowed. Europe unwittingly created the all-too-familiar problem facing
highly indebted developing countries and emerging markets. It could, of course,
have avoided this. Europe as a whole could have borrowed in euros, on-lending
the proceeds to the different countries. But it chose not to do that, and in making
that choice, it chose to enhance the likelihood of a debt crisis.
This, one might say, was an “accidental” consequence of the creation of a euro,
one to which little attention was given before the crisis. More disturbing were as-
pects of the eurozone that were features that were thought of as essential to its
success, but were designed in such a way as to ensure its failure. I am referring
here to various aspects of the “single market principle” – and the instability of a
single market without a banking union.
Confidence in any country’s banking system rests partially on the confidence in the
ability and willingness of the bank’s government to bail it out – and/or in the existence
of (1) institutional frameworks that reduce the likelihood that a bailout will be nec-
essary, (2) special funds set aside should a bailout be necessary, and (3) procedures in
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place to ensure that depositors will be made whole. Typically, there is an implicit
subsidy from which banks in jurisdictions with governments with greater bailout
capacity benefit. Thus, money flowed into the United States after the 2008 global
crisis, which failures within the United States’ financial system had brought about,
simply because there was more confidence that the United States had the will-
ingness and ability to bail out its banks. Similarly, today in Europe, what Spaniard
or Greek would rationally keep his money in a local bank, when there is (almost)
equal convenience and greater safety in putting it in a German bank?19 Only by
paying higher interest rates can banks in those countries compete, but that puts
them at a competitive disadvantage; and the increase in interest rate required may
be too great – the bank would quickly appear to be non-viable. What typically
happens is capital flight (or, in the current case, what has been described as a cap-
ital jog: the surprise is not that capital is leaving, but that it is not leaving faster).
But that sets in motion a downward spiral: as capital leaves, the country’s banks
restrict lending, the economy weakens, the perceived ability of the country to
bail out its banks weakens, and capital is further incentivized to leave. 
Private austerity compounds the effect of public austerity in a vicious circle.
For public austerity itself leads to more defaults and a weaker banking system.
And the decrease in lending activity leads to poorer economic performance and
unexpectedly poor results from austerity. 
The single-market principle for financial institutions and capital, too, can lead to
a regulatory race to the bottom, with at least some of the costs of the failures borne by
other jurisdictions. The failure of a financial institution imposes costs on others
(evidenced so clearly in the crisis of 2008), and governments will not typically
take into account these cross-border costs. That is why there either has to be reg-
ulation by the host country (see the Stiglitz Report, 2010), or there has to be strong
regulation at the European level. 
The instability of a single labor market without mutualization of debt creates
a similar kind of instability. Free mobility of factors without a common debt leads to
inefficient and unstable allocation of factors. The principle of free mobility is to en-
sure that factors move to where (marginal) returns are highest, and if factor prices
are equal to marginal productivity, that should happen. But what individuals care
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slower than some had anticipated. This, in turn, is a consequence of institutional and market
imperfections (e.g., rules about knowing your customer, designed to curb money laundering),
which, interestingly, the neo-classical model underlying much of Europe’s policy agenda ig-
nored. There is far less of a single market than is widely thought to exist. 
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about, among other things, is the after-tax returns to labor, and this depends not
only on the marginal productivity of labor (the before-tax wage in the neo-classical
model) but also on taxes and the provision of public goods. Taxes, in turn, depend
in part on the burden imposed by inherited debt. This can be seen in the cases of
Ireland, Greece, and Spain. All three are facing towering levels of inherited debt
(a debt that had not swollen to its current levels by making investments in educa-
tion, technology, or infrastructure, i.e., through the acquisition of assets, but
through financial and macroeconomic mismanagement). This implies migration
away from these highly indebted countries to those with less indebtedness, even
when marginal productivities are the same; and the more individuals move out,
the greater the tax burden on the remainder becomes, accelerating the movement
of labor away from an efficient allocation.20 This migration pattern is exacerbated
by the cutbacks in public services associated with austerity and the underinvest-
ment by the government, e.g. in infrastructure, technology, and education. All of
these make living in the afflicted countries less attractive, inducing outmigration.
(Of course, in the short run, migration may bring positive benefits to the crisis
country, as it reduces the burden of unemployment insurance and enhances do-
mestic purchasing power as the remittances from abroad sent by the emigrants
roll in. Whether these “benefits” to migration outweigh the adverse effects in the
short run, noted above, is an empirical question. The outward migration also hides
the severity of the underlying downturn, since it means that the unemployment
rate is less, possibly far less, than it otherwise would be).21
Moreover, free migration might result in politically unacceptable patterns of loca-
tion of economic activity. The general theory of migration/local public goods has
shown that decentralized patterns of migration may well result in inefficient and
socially undesirable patterns of location of economic activity and concentrations
of population.22 There can be congestion and agglomeration externalities (both
positive and negative) that arise from free migration.23 That is why many countries
have an explicit policy for regional development, attempting to offset the inefficient
and/or socially unacceptable patterns emerging from unfettered markets. 
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20 Interestingly, this problem has long been recognized in the theory of fiscal federalism/local
public goods. See, e.g., STIGLITZ J.E. (1977; 1983a; 1983b).
21 By the same token, if some of the burden of taxation is imposed on capital, it will induce
capital to move out of the country. 
22 See, e.g. STIGLITZ J.E. (1977) and TIEBOUT C. (1956). 
23 STIGLITZ J.E. (1977; 1983a; 1983b).
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In the context of Europe, free migration (especially that arising from debt ob-
ligations inherited from the past) may result in depopulation not only of certain
regions within countries but of certain countries. One of the important adjust-
ment mechanisms in the United States (which shares a common currency) is in-
ternal migration; and, if such migration leads to the depopulation of an entire
state, there is limited concern.24 But Greece and Ireland are justifiably concerned
about the depopulation of their homelands.
3.2 Increasing Inequality
It is now recognized that one of the central problems facing the advanced
world is the increase in inequality, but the eurozone framework limits what can
be done about this. 
Free mobility of capital and goods without tax harmonization not only can lead to
an inefficient allocation of capital but can also reduce the potential for redistributive
taxation, leading to high levels of after-tax and transfer inequality. Competition
among jurisdictions can be healthy, but there can also be a race to the bottom.
Capital goes to the jurisdiction that taxes it at the lowest rate, not where its mar-
ginal productivity is the highest. To compete, other jurisdictions must lower the
taxes they impose on capital, and since capital is more unequally distributed than
labor, this reduces the scope for redistributive taxation. (A similar argument applies
to skilled labor.) Inequality, it is increasingly recognized, is not just a moral issue:
it affects the performance of the economy in numerous ways (Stiglitz, 2012).
4. - The Flawed Policy Response
The previous section argued that there were fundamental problems with the
structure of the euro, problems that would inevitably have manifested themselves
sooner or later. The global financial crisis of 2008 meant only that the problems
became manifested sooner than they might otherwise have become apparent, a
short eight years after the launch. It was, indeed, a short spell of “success” for a
monetary regime, which often survive decades before their defects become evident. 
Some say that at least it worked well for a few years, until 2008. To be sure,
as we have noted, the losses since then more than offset the few good years that
preceded the crisis. But the problems in the overall economic framework began
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well before 2008, and contributed to the crisis: irrationally exuberant markets ig-
nored country risk, as money flowed freely into Greece, Spain, and other coun-
tries on the periphery. The dominant ideology did nothing about the bubbles or
the current account imbalances. The common currency and the single market
gave confidence to the reckless investors. If only the reckless investors bore the
consequences of their decisions, that would be one thing. But there are large
macroeconomic externalities. Those who set up the eurozone seemed oblivious
to these, as they blithely went ahead with an economic framework based on their
overconfidence in efficiency and stability.
The difficulties that have been so evident in what can only be called the lost
decade that Europe is facing now – a lost decade that may well be translated into
a lost quarter century unless something is done – is a result of the compounding
of these structural problems with a set of policy failures.
4.1 Austerity
Europe’s problem today is lack of aggregate demand, and austerity exacerbates
that problem. 
No large economy – and Europe is a large economy – has ever emerged from
a crisis at the same time that it has imposed austerity. Austerity always, inevitably,
and predictably makes matters worse. The examples where fiscal stringency has
been associated with recovery are for the most part countries where reductions in
government spending are offset by increases in exports. These are generally small
countries, typically with flexible exchange rates, and where trading partners are
growing robustly. But that is hardly the situation confronting Europe’s crisis
countries today: their major trading partners are in recession, and each has no
control over its exchange rate.25
We remarked that fiscal profligacy before the crisis was not the cause of Spain
and Ireland’s collapse: the crisis caused the fiscal crisis, not the other way around.
Fiscal stringency would not cure this crisis, let alone prevent the next. 
At the same time, even for Greece, it was clear that Germany’s prescription –
more severe and more effectively enforced budgetary cutbacks – was not going
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25 ALESINA A. and ARDAGNA S. (2010) have tried to propagate the idea that expansionary con-
tractions are possible. But there is a growing consensus that their analyses are badly flawed,
and that that is not the case. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) (2010); BAKER
D. (2010) and JAYADEV A. and KONCZAL M. (2010).
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to help Greece climb out of its hole. On the contrary, there was every reason to
believe that this very prescription would deepen the crisis.26
The austerity measures have been particularly ineffective, because the market
understood that they would bring with them recessions, political turmoil, and
disappointing improvements in the fiscal position, as tax revenues declined. Rat-
ing agencies have downgraded countries instituting austerity measures, and rightly
so. Spain was downgraded as the first austerity measures were passed: one of the
rating agencies believed that Spain would do what it promised, and it knew that
that meant low growth and a worsening of its economic woes. 
European officials who prescribed austerity suggested when these programs
were first adopted27 that those who adopted them would quickly be on their way
to restored prosperity. They have been wrong, and repeatedly so. They have re-
peatedly underestimated the magnitude of the downturn that their policies would
bring about, and as a result, they have consistently underestimated the fiscal ben-
efit that would be derived: deeper downturns inevitably result in lower revenues
and higher expenditures for unemployment and social programs. Though they
then try to blame the crisis countries for missing the fiscal targets, the fact is that
it is their misdiagnosis of the problem and the resulting wrong prescription that
should be held accountable. 
Spain and Greece are in depression – there is no other way to describe the sit-
uation28 with high unemployment (youth unemployment well in excess of 50%)
and income per capita, adjusted for inflation, well below the pre-crisis peak – and
Rivista di Politica Economica luglio/settembre 2014
24
26 Indeed, by so manifestly showing their profound ignorance of the fundamentals underlying
the crisis, the authorities scared the markets. Even if they had understood what was at stake,
even if they repeatedly reiterated their commitment to the European project, their display of
enormous resistance to undertaking the necessary reforms in the European framework surely
contributed to the markets’ loss of confidence, helping to explain why in the initial phase of
the crisis, each of the so-called rescue measures turned out to be only temporary palliatives.
27 For example, British Conservative David Cameron in his April 2009 speech, “The Age of Aus-
terity”, expounded on austerity not as just a short-term strategy but as a philosophical shift
that would restore the vibrancy of Britain’s economy. Without it, he said, «[W]e risk becoming
once again the sick man of Europe. Our recovery will be held back, and our children will be
weighed down, by a millstone of debt». The actual results of austerity in Britain have not lived
up to his promises.
28 Economists technically refer to a recession as two sequential quarters of negative growth. In these
terms, most of the countries in Europe have moved out of recession. I am using the term “de-
pression” in the less technical sense: an extended period over which unemployment is very high
and during which income per capita remains below, possibly significantly so, its previous peak.
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that depression is largely a result of misguided policies foisted on these countries
(though their own leaders are to blame, for having acquiesced, but only because
they belivered, perhaps wrongly, that the proposed “solution” was better than
any alternative available to them).
4.2 Bootstrap Operations: Savings Banks and Sovereigns, Simultaneously
The immediate symptom of the crisis was the inability of Greece and some of
the other countries in the periphery to roll over their debts and to finance their
deficit. But it soon became clear that Europe faced a crisis not only in the sover-
eign debt market, but also in its banking system. 
There was something especially peculiar about Europe’s attempt at a bootstrap
operation, whereby lending to the government would help bail out the banks,
and lending to the banks would help bail out the governments. 
4.3 A “Confidence” Game?
What finally restored stability (but not strong growth) to Europe was the
promise of the head of the ECB, Mario Draghi, to do whatever it takes to support
the European sovereign bond market. Sovereign spreads came down. The increase
in bond values improved the balance sheet of banks. It was a confidence game
that was seemingly costless and has worked – at least for a while. No one knows,
of course, if a day of reckoning came, in which the ECB would have to support
the bond market of a periphery country in the face of a sudden loss in confidence
in that country’s bonds, whether it could or would do “whatever it takes.” As this
article goes to press, Draghi’s promise has not been put to the test.
Still, it seems a weak reed upon which to rely. What is needed is more than a
confidence game. 
5. - What Should Be Done?
This analysis of the fundamental flaws underlying the eurozone suggests a set
of policies that might help resolve the crisis. I say might: these reforms are necessary
to make the euro work, but they are not necessarily sufficient. The divergence
between an optimal currency area and the eurozone – the divergences, for in-
stance, in economic structures that can give rise to desired changes in exchange
rates, either in the short run in response to shocks, or in the long run in response
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to systemic differences in productivity and inflation trends – may be too large to
make a system of a single currency work.
In this section, I propose a set of reforms – structural and policy changes –
that hold out the promise not only of making the euro survive, but also helping
to ensure that the eurozone prospers.
5.1 Structural Reforms
The six key structural changes that are necessarily follow directly from our
analysis above.
5.1.1 A Common Fiscal Framework
The first necessary reform is a common fiscal framework – more than and
fundamentally different from an austerity pact, or a strengthened version of the
growth and stability pact. As I noted, it was not overspending that brought on
Spain’s or Ireland’s problems. 
Addressing the underlying problems of Europe is at its core a collective action
problem for Europe, requiring Europe-wide resources – more resources than are
currently available to the afflicted countries. What is needed is not just funds to
support a common agricultural policy, or structural funds for new entrants. What
is needed is solidarity funds for stabilization – enough funding to help countries
facing adverse shocks restore their economies to health. 
Funding at the center (compared to those of the separate countries) need not
be at the level of the United States, but it needs to be far more than the miniscule
level today. 
5.1.2 Mutualization of Debt
We have explained that under current arrangements, Europe has created the
potential for sovereign debt crises simply because it forces countries to borrow in
a currency that is not under their own control. What is required then is “mutu-
alization” of debt – Europe-wide debt, owed in euros. This would make Europe’s
debt similar to America’s debt, and with Europe’s overall debt-to-GDP ratio lower
than that of the US, presumably interest rates would be comparable.29 Such mu-
tualization would lower interest rates, allowing more spending to stimulate the
economy and restore growth.
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ure, was 92.7% of GDP (Eurostat data), while the United States had a 101.5% debt-to-GDP
ratio in the fourth quarter of 2013 Q4 (St. Louis Fed data).
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Mutualizaton of debt could be accomplished through a number of institu-
tional mechanisms (Eurobonds, ECB borrowing, and on-lending to nations).
How to design such a system (in a way that does not lead to excessive borrowing)
would take me beyond the scope of this paper. For now, I simply note: the posi-
tion of some in Europe against such mutualization – claiming that Europe is a
transfer union – is wrong on two counts: 
(a)It exaggerates the risk of default, at least the risks of default if debt is mutual-
ized. At low interest rates, most of the crisis countries should have no trouble
servicing their debts.30 Of course, in the absence of debt mutualization, there
is a serious risk of partial default (which has already happened in the case of
Greece). The irony is that existing arrangements may actually lead to larger
losses on the part of creditor countries than a system of well-designed mutu-
alization. 
(b)Any system of successful economic integration must involve some assistance
from the stronger countries to the weaker. (The desirability of such transfers,
even in the absence of economic integration, was evidenced by the Marshall
Plan after World War II and the large debt forgiveness of Germany by the Al-
lies. More recently, Europe itself has provided substantial funds to new en-
trants, to enable their economies to converge).
5.1.3 A Common Financial System (Banking Union)
The third necessary reform is a common banking system – with deposits insured
by a Europe-wide deposit insurance fund, and with common regulations and a
common approach to resolution of insolvent banks. I have already explained why
a common deposit insurance fund is required: without that, funds will flow from
the banking system of “weak” countries to the banks in strong countries, further
weakening those already having problems. But without a common regulatory sys-
tem, a system with a common deposit insurance scheme could be open to abuse. 
But a common regulatory system should have scope for taking different macro-
prudential stances in different countries, or even in regions within a country. We
described earlier how having a single central bank took away an important in-
strument of adjustment – the interest rate. But there are a host of other regulatory
provisions (such as capital adequacy requirements) that can be adjusted according
to the macroeconomic circumstances. Lending standards for mortgages should,
for instance, be tightened at a place or time where there appears to be the risk of
a bubble forming.
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5.1.4 Further Structural Reforms
There are three further reforms that are desirable and perhaps even necessary
if the euro is to survive. One is a move towards tax harmonization, restricting the
race to the bottom in capital taxation, and eliminating the distortions caused by
tax competition among countries. 
A second is a framework that would not just allow, but encourage, industrial
policies that would enable those behind to catch up, to prevent further diver-
gences within the countries of Europe.
A third is a change in the mandate of the ECB from its single-minded focus
on inflation to a broader mandate that would include growth, employment, and
financial stability.
5.2 Policy Reforms
These structural reforms are necessary for the long-run viability of the eurozone.
But they will not be sufficient to restore Europe’s economy quickly to health. In
addition, there is a set of policy reforms. But many of the necessary policy reforms
won’t work unless they are accompanied by (or preceded by) structural reforms.
For instance, today, many are urging the end of austerity. But if a country such
as Spain suddenly started spending more, even if its deficits could be financed,
current account deficits would increase. There is more than a little chance that
these current account deficits would not be sustainable. 
The problem is that there needs to be an adjustment of the real (effective) ex-
change rate. This might be accomplished through internal devaluation, but we
have explained why that is not likely to work. The structural and policy reforms
need to respond to this reality.
5.2.1 From Austerity to Growth 
European leaders have recognized that Europe’s problems will not be solved
without growth. But they have failed to explain how growth can be achieved with
austerity. Instead, they assert that what is needed is a restoration of confidence,
as if confidence could be created out of whole cloth, simply by giving an impas-
sioned lecture, or by announcing a strategy of deficit reduction. However, aus-
terity will not bring about growth or confidence. Europe’s sorry record of
ultimately failed policies – after repeated attempts to fashion patchwork solutions
for economic problems it was misdiagnosing – have undermined confidence. Be-
cause austerity has destroyed growth, it has also destroyed confidence, and will
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continue to do so, no matter how many speeches are given about the importance
of confidence and growth.30
The structural reforms that I described earlier – the mutualization of debt and
a banking union – would provide space for a return to growth: there could be a
mutually reinforcing expansion of government spending on, say, growth-enhanc-
ing public investments and private lending that would support private investments.
There are other actions that would be supportive, such as an increase in Eu-
rope-wide lending for small businesses, or an expansion of European Investment
Bank lending in the afflicted countries. So would be policies that would support,
for instance, greater availability of credit in countries in economic downturn (rec-
ognizing that it is not just interest rates on government bonds, but the spread be-
tween those interest rates and lending rates, and the availability of funds that
determines the level of investment). (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2003).
5.2.2 Adjustment of Real Exchange Rates
An inherent problem in a single currency area is that the key adjustment mech-
anisms of interest rates and exchange rates have been removed from the set of
available instruments. In the previous paragraph, we have noted that monetary
and banking authorities still have other instruments that can affect both the
amount of lending and the terms at which such lending is available – instruments
that have been underappreciated by monetary authorities.
But as changes in productivity and prices and wages can differ across countries,
there needs to be changes in real exchange rates. There are two ways that this can
be done: internal devaluation for the “overvalued” currencies, and inflation for
the undervalued currencies. At an abstract level, these two adjustment mecha-
nisms look similar. In practice, they are markedly different. First, as we noted,
internal devaluation represents an increase in leverage, in the real value of the
debts in these countries, and thus the hoped-for expansionary benefits may not
be realized. By contrast, inflation is a form of deleveraging in the countries with
an undervalued currency, and thus has an expansionary effect.
Moreover, there is ample evidence of “downward rigidities” in wages and
prices, so in practice, engineering an internal devaluation is far harder than man-
aging limited increases in wages and prices.
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econometric model has confirmed these beliefs. On the contrary, the first-order effect of the
deficit reduction is a slowdown in the economy, and the slowdown destroys confidence. 
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The implication of this is clear: Germany should do what it can to induce
moderate increases in wages and prices, e.g. by passing minimum wage laws. Such
policies might, at the same time, address the problems that that country has been
facing at the bottom of its income distribution.
5.2.3 Towards Debt Restructuring
For most eurozone economies, these reforms would, for now, suffice. But there
may be some (like Greece) where the cumulative impact of past mistakes (not
only their own past budgetary mistakes, but also those that were forced on them
in the early responses to the crisis) is such that more is needed. They will have to
restructure their debts.
Debt restructuring is an essential part of capitalism. Every country has a bank-
ruptcy law that facilitates the restructuring of debts in an orderly way. Though
after the Argentine crisis, there were calls for the creation of sovereign-debt re-
structuring mechanisms, one of President George W. Bush’s many sins was to veto
that initiative. In the subsequent years, when there were no sovereign debt crises,
there was little concern about the issue. Elsewhere, I have described what such a
mechanism might look like (Stiglitz, 2010b). But in the absence of such a mech-
anism, countries have to act on their own – as Argentina showed was possible. 
But if some country needs debt restructuring to enhance growth, it should be
done quickly and deeply. And one shouldn’t feel too sorry for the creditors:
lenders have been receiving high interest rates reflecting such risks.31 There is
some evidence that, on average, they are more than compensated for such risks.
By the same token, as we noted earlier, the costs to the economies doing the re-
structuring may be less than widely assumed. Both theory and evidence suggest
that countries that do such restructuring can later regain access to global financial
markets, often quickly; but even if, going forward, countries have to rely on their
own savings, the adverse consequences may be far less than the benefits they re-
ceive from the debt restructuring.
Argentina has also shown that there is life after debt and that there are large
benefits to the reform of monetary arrangements. Indeed, there are good reasons
to believe that a deep debt restructuring will have positive benefits – providing
more fiscal space for expansionary policies, so long as the government does not
have a primary deficit. It is important that the debt write-down be deep – other-
wise, the lingering uncertainty about the possibility of another debt restructuring
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will cast a pall over the recovery. And because of the uncertainty about future
growth, and therefore of debt sustainability, GDP-indexed bonds may represent
an effective form of risk-sharing (which can be thought of, at the sovereign level,
as the equivalent of the conversion of debt into equity, at the corporate level –
see Miller and Zhang, 2014; Griffith-Jones and Hertova, 2013 and Barr, Bush,
and Pienkowski, 2014).32 33
6. - Concluding Comments
I have described how the current regime has led much of Europe into a state
of depression, with high unemployment and incomes still below pre-crisis levels.
As this article goes to press, Europe is celebrating its emergence from recession.
It is heralding the end of recession as proof that the austerity framework has
worked. But there is a big difference between the end of recession and a robust
recovery. There is little hope that the countries that are in depression will return
to full employment any time soon, or even that their economies will soon return
to pre-crisis levels of GDP per capita. We should not let our aspirations respond
to the dismal record of the past several years: Even the best performing country,
Germany, would have been given a failing grade in normal times. As we have
pointed out, adjusted for the growth in labor force, Germany’s performance is
poorer than that of Japan, long noted for its extended and disappointing malaise.
When account is taken of the declining incomes in large parts of its population,
its performance looks even more dismal.34
6.1 Undermining Democracy
The current regime is also undermining the legitimacy of democratic economic
institutions. The European project was a top-down initiative. There was a very
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32 As SANDLERIS G. (2012) points out, the costs may be less related to those imposed externally,
and more related to failures of the government to deal effectively with the internal disturbances
associated with debt restructuring, e.g. to the financial system (banking, insurance, and pen-
sions).
33 For a broader discussion of the role of debt restructurings in dealing with debt crises, see HEY-
MANN D. and STIGLITZ J.E. (2014). 
34 And as we have also pointed out, even this dismal performance is not one that provides a model
for others: it was based on persistent surpluses. By definition, not all countries can run sur-
pluses. A basic law of economics is that the sum of deficits must equal the sum of the surpluses,
so not every country can run surpluses. When all try to run surpluses, the paradox of thrift
sets in: there is a deficiency of aggregate demand, and the entire world suffers.
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short period of prosperity35 – based in some countries on access to credit at irra-
tionally low interest rates. The promises of sustained prosperity were not delivered
upon. The rules of the game not only failed to deliver on sustained macroeco-
nomic growth, they also have led to widening inequality, with governments re-
strained in their ability to redress growing inequities. Evidently, the elites created
a system that seems to have done well only for those at the top.
In many quarters, there is concern about the ceding of effective economic
power – originally to Brussels’s bureaucrats, but increasingly to German politi-
cians, undermining national democracies. 
6.2 Undermining the European Project
There is widespread confusion between the European project and the euro: one
can have close economic integration without sharing a common currency. One
cannot share a common currency without having close economic integration. A
critical failure of Europe’s leaders was that they believed they could use a single
currency to propel deeper economic integration. The response to the crisis has not
been to strengthen European solidarity, but rather to expose the fissures. 
6.3 Urgency
The incongruence between the pace of markets and that of the politics could
present a separate problem for the survival of the euro. Many European leaders,
for instance, have recognized that eventually a single banking framework, with
common regulations, deposit insurance, and resolution, will be necessary. But
others argue that such a dramatic reform must be done carefully, in a step-by-
step process. First, there must be common regulations, and when the regulatory
system has been “proven,” Europe can go on to the next stage(s). Were there not
an ongoing crisis, such an argument would have some merit. But those with cap-
ital in, say, the Spanish banks will not wait: the benefits of waiting are nil, the
risks are substantial. And so, while European leaders dither, the banking systems
in the afflicted countries will weaken, and with the weakening of the banking
system, there will be a weakening of the economies – exacerbating the adverse ef-
fects of austerity.36
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35 Monetary arrangements often have a short life span – witness the ERM. Even the Bretton
Woods system (fixed exchange rates) lasted less than three decades. 
36 The slow pace of reforms has led to other problems: Ireland, one of the first countries to receive
assistance, became concerned that later countries will get a better “deal.” 
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We have repeatedly noted that the effects of these mistaken policies are likely
to be long lived. Europe’s future potential growth is being lowered as a result of
the mistakes being made today. There are important hysteresis effects: the gen-
eration entering the labor force today will not be building up their skills, creating
the human capital, that would make them more productive in later years. 
6.4 The High Price of the Euro
The crisis in Europe is manmade. It has not been caused by a famine or some
other natural disaster. Indeed, there was no sudden change in the underlying state
variables describing the European economy, no war that wiped out large portions
of its physical and human capital stock, not even an innovation or an economic
transformation that would have led to rapid obsolescence of its capital stock.
There have, of course, been sudden changes in expectations, and in our under-
standings: we know (or at least we should now know) that markets are not neces-
sarily quickly self-correcting, that under-regulated markets can give rise to bubbles
and credit excesses, that Greece or Spain having the same currency as Germany
does not mean that Greek or Spanish debt is as safe as that of Germany, and it
may not even fully eliminate exchange-rate risk and, in ways that we have ex-
plained, may actually increase default risk. 
Crises are complex events, and it is inevitably overly simplistic to find a sin-
gle-cause explanation. Still, it should be clear that the euro crisis, like so many
other crises, is more attributable to market excesses than to government profli-
gacy. The excesses occurred not just in Europe but perhaps even more in the
United States. If government is to be blamed, it is for a failure to tame the (re-
peated) market excesses. Prevention entails understanding how to curb the ex-
cesses, and how to design institutional arrangements that limit the opportunity
for such excesses. The creators of the eurozone, reflecting the ideology of the
time, worried about the wrong problem: they focused on government failures,
when the real source of the crisis was in the private sector.
Thus, the euro crisis is the result of unstable market processes embedded in a
flawed set of institutional arrangements and policy frameworks created in of the
pre-crisis years which increased the likelihood of the occurrence of crises and en-
hanced the consequences of any crisis that did occur. Government policies can
affect countries’ exposure to risk and the structural stability of the system (the
extent to which there can be market excesses) as well as impede or facilitate ad-
justments. Deregulation and financial and capital-market liberalization have pro-
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vided new opportunities for destabilizing market processes and opened up new
channels by which the instabilities in one country can affect others (Stiglitz et al.,
2006). Worse still, the design of the eurozone did not buffer shocks, but rather
amplified them: the system was inherently unstable in a number of dimensions.
The elimination of automatic stabilizers, and their replacement in some cases by
automatic destabilizers, has introduced new instabilities into the economic system. 
We have seen how institutional changes surrounding the eurozone – intended
to create a more stable and prosperous economy – played out in ways that were,
at the time of the founding of the Euro, largely unanticipated, but which – at
least in hindsight – were totally understandable given the structural flaws in the
eurozone’s institutional arrangements. 
The same kind of flawed reasoning that led to these structural flaws – funda-
mental flaws in the economic framework for the eurozone – also contributed to
the flaws in the response to the crisis once it became evident. The ability of the
countries to adjust to a man-made shock was inhibited, and nothing was put in
its place. The central issue in the resolution of a crisis is to understand how to
ensure that, after a crisis, resources are put back to use as quickly as possible. Re-
sources were wasted by the private sector before the crisis, say in the real estate
bubbles in Ireland and Spain. But this private sector waste of resources is dwarfed
by the waste of resources that has occurred after the crisis, as the eurozone went
into recession, as some of the countries went into depression, and as the region
as a whole did not live up to its potential. 
The governments of Europe should have realized that market forces by them-
selves may not only lead to endogenous disturbances (like bubbles), but may re-
spond to shocks in a destabilizing way. Government intervention (e.g., through
debt restructuring, countercyclical macro-policies, and well-designed bank recap-
italizations) can reduce the enormous costs that have traditionally been associated
with crises. But the actions of Europe have been the opposite: they have increased
the costs – the depth of the downturn, the extent, and the duration. 
Crises are perhaps an inherent feature of capitalism. But they do not have to
be as frequent, as deep, and as costly as they have been. The standard macroeco-
nomic models ignored history – which had shown that capitalism had been
marked by large fluctuations, with great suffering, since the start. The models
equally ignored key market failures that help explain persistent inefficiencies and
instabilities. In doing so, policymakers using those models may have violated the
central principle of Hippocrates: do no harm. The policies and institutional
arrangements based on these simplistic models and theories created the pre-con-
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ditions for the euro crisis. Had America not managed its financial system so badly,
it is conceivable that the euro might have had a few more “good” years. But I
have argued that there were deep inherent problems: it was essentially inevitable
that eventually the eurozone would have faced a crisis. It is conceivable that by
allowing the excesses and imbalances to have continued, the crisis that would
have then ensued would have been even worse. 
The same flaws in reasoning that led to the poor design of the eurozone led to
a misdiagnosis of the roots of the crisis and that in turn led to the flawed policy
response, which in turn have contributed to the slow recovery from this Great
Recession – a downturn that, while not as deep as the Great Depression, may
begin to rival it in duration. 
The original hope of the euro can be restored. But it will not happen on its
own. It won’t happen if the leaders of Europe continue to blame the victims, the
countries that are suffering from recession and depression. It will only happen if
they recognize the fundamental flaws, both in the institutional arrangements and
the policy frameworks, and make the requisite reforms that I have discussed. 
TABLE 1
GDP PER CAPITA, CONSTANT 2013 US $






United Kingdom 47,745 45,148
United States 52,049 51,366
*Germany data is for 2008, its pre-crisis peak year.
Source: World Bank.
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GRAPH 1
EURO ZONE
(EXCLUDING ESTONIA, LATVIA, MALTA, SLOVAK, SLOVENIA DUE TO
INCOMPLETE DATA)
Source: IMF data and Author’s calculations.
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GRAPH 2
EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES
(BILLIONS) 
Source: Data from the World Bank for all years except 2013. Note that 2013 values are estimated based on growth
rate data from IMF WEO. Quantity values are expressed in constant 2005 USD, which is the baseline year in
which the World Bank reports its data.
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*2013 data for Italy and Portugal are estimates. 
Source: IMF.
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